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1. Introduction: A Brief Outline of the Current 
Surveillance Scenario 
Over the past decade, we have witnessed a drastic in-
tensification of both the spread and use of media tech-
nologies and infrastructures (MTI). Education, work, 
politics, consumption, and socialization are but a few 
central spheres of life that are deeply infiltrated by dig-
itization today. Practices related to or oriented towards 
MTI penetrate people’s daily habits and routines to an 
unprecedented degree. This ongoing process has al-
tered and, in many cases, multiplied people’s ability to 
connect with each other, and has had a tremendous in-
fluence on the way people engage with the world at 
large (Couldry, 2012; Hepp, 2012). At the same time, 
networked technologies also enable a wide range of 
agencies and institutions to exercise control at a dis-
tance as well as to collect, sort, analyze and exploit the 
tremendous amounts of data that accumulate across 
mediated interactions. In many cases, this has resulted 
in a “collect everything” approach that is generally un-
derstood as surveillance; which, for now, is broadly de-
fined as attention that is “purposeful, routine, system-
atic and focused attention paid to personal details, for 
the sake of control, entitlement, management, influ-
ence, or protection”(Murakami et al., 2006, p. 4). Sur-
veillance, according to David Lyon, connotes any “collec-
tion or processing of personal data, whether identifiable 
or not, for the purposes of influencing or managing 
those whose data have been garnered” (2001, p. 2). One 
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could look at the past decades and list both the benefi-
cial and the problematic effects of technology. Yet, the 
story I want to tell in this article is somewhat more com-
plicated and tries to avoid making overly sharp fraction-
ations. Steering a middle ground in the current discus-
sion on surveillance is by no means an easy task to 
perform as the debate is (over)loaded with accusations, 
idealizations, and a generous portion of ideology. This is 
particularly the case since Edward Snowden’s revela-
tions have expanded the notion of surveillance beyond a 
rather small expert discourse, and have instead cata-
pulted the issue into the mainstream by increasing the 
level of media, public and political debate. 
An accessible way to begin this analysis is to think 
about the spaces and places we experience surveil-
lance first hand. Here, one might diagnose surveillance 
as a phenomenon that is most pressing in urban envi-
ronments, as it is in the city and its surroundings where 
the highest number of surveillance forms and modes 
come together—video surveillance, license plate scan-
ners, airports screenings, surveillance satellites and 
drones, as well as a number of other remote sensing 
and processing devices. Due to the invention and use 
of complex technical systems, it is no longer impossible 
to track and assess the simultaneous movements of 
tens of thousands of people through a major city. In 
fact, as scholars have argued convincingly, the ever-
increasing surveillance in publicly accessible spaces, 
such as shopping malls, city streets and places for pub-
lic transport, changes the ways in which power is exer-
cised in urban space (Koskela, 2000). As a conse-
quence, surveillance contributes to the production of 
the urban. The city is without a doubt a telling example 
that demonstrates that the intensification of digitaliza-
tion often goes along with the amplification of surveil-
lance (see Graham, 2004). Yet, as the above reference to 
contemporary MTI indicates, the “track record” of sur-
veillance goes far beyond spatial and physical bounda-
ries like urban environments. This, to acknowledge the 
history of the debate, is not necessarily a new observa-
tion as such. In his book on the impact of electronic da-
ta processing on personal privacy in the late 1960s, 
Jeremy Rosenberg stated that, “With the advance of 
technology, centralized data accumulation becomes 
easier, the reward for intrusion is increased, and con-
trol shifts to still fewer people” (Rosenberg, 1969, p. 1). 
Yet, times have changed drastically. In particular, the 
convergence and pervasiveness of MTI that have been 
developed and disseminated over the past two decades, 
enable surveillance attention to be continuous, widely 
distributed, and persistent. Considering today’s vast 
(largely automated) computer power and the quasi-
omnipresence of digital devices, the surveillance appa-
ratuses that are currently in place, as well as those that 
are emerging and spreading, are historically distinctive. 
In the following section, I will explicate what exactly 
makes our times distinctive by highlighting the delicate 
relationship between surveillance, privacy and the 
health of contemporary democratic constellations. I ar-
gue that hacker organizations like the Chaos Computer 
Club are one among a range of actors that counter-act 
contemporary assemblages of surveillance and by doing 
so act on indispensable structural features of democratic 
constellations. To develop this argument, the article is 
divided into three sections. In the first, I discuss three el-
ements—popular online platforms, locative media and 
big data—that I consider determinative for contempo-
rary surveillance contexts, and then analyze the increas-
ingly symbiotic relationship between government agen-
cies and corporations when it comes to surveillance 
tactics and practices. In the second section, I focus on 
the notion of privacy and why it matters for democracy 
at large. Finally, I use these concepts to examine a quali-
tative case study of the Chaos Computer Club. 
2. Online Platforms, Locative Media and Big Data 
Let me start by illuminating three elements that have 
intensified since the early 2000s and that have lastingly 
influenced both the way people experience surveil-
lance as well as the way it is practiced. First, popular 
online platforms. The past years have seen an unprec-
edented triumphal march of a range of platforms that 
are often referred to as “social media” (see van Dijck, 
2013). Considering the ambivalent evolution of the 
term—coming out of a business background—and the 
possible interpretation that all other media might be 
non- or even anti-social, I consider it more appropriate 
to use the term popular online platforms (see Gillespie, 
2010) instead of social media. The main purpose of 
these platforms is to enable and simplify networking 
practices via mediated communication. To accomplish 
their goal, they heavily rely on personal data shared by 
the user. In accordance with this procedure scholars 
consider online “social networking” as a set of practic-
es that are inherently based on self-surveillance (Fuchs 
et al., 2012). In addition, corporations make explicit use 
of online platforms to monitor and discuss strategies 
for responding to activists’ initiatives (Uldam, 2014). In 
fact, popular online platforms have become part of 
people’s daily routines to such an extent that they have 
become an imminent component of and an ideal envi-
ronment for surveillance. This is not least the case be-
cause a small number of centralized communication 
platforms are much easier to browse, analyze and gain 
access to than decentralized infrastructures. 
Second, locative media. With the transformation of 
mobile media from a communication tool into a multi-
modal device accompanied by global positioning sys-
tems enabling users to share information about one’s 
whereabouts, locative media play a critical role in 
emerging modes of surveillance (Hjorth, 2013). Geotag-
ging, location search and detection services amplified by 
portable and wearable devices like smartphones, tablet 
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computers and smartwatches create new forms of co-
presence that disrupt old binaries between online and 
offline (Schwartz & Halegoua, 2014). The potential to 
create new levels of surveillance is further enhanced by 
the fact that locative media intersect with online plat-
forms in many ways because a growing number of ser-
vices harvest their users’ location information. Taking in-
to account that it is exactly the way people use devices, 
platforms and services that create unprecedentedly 
large data bodies, scholars have argued that surveillance 
to a large extent has become participatory (Al-
brechtslund, 2008). One can sharpen this line of thought 
by pointing out that the rhetoric of the participatory 
turn actively exempts surveillance from legal and social 
control, resulting in a model of surveillance that is light, 
politically nimble, relatively impervious to regulatory 
constraint and even casts surveillance in an unambigu-
ously progressive light (Cohen, 2015/forthcoming). Iron-
ically, then, so-called participatory media are intimate-
ly connected with surveillance. 
Third, “big data”. Big data—a notion that not only 
describes the sheer amount of data but also denotes 
automated, software-based data gathering, manage-
ment and analytic capabilities—is best considered the 
missing piece to the puzzle called surveillance. After all, 
that is what surveillance is all about: solving a puzzle by 
bringing the fitting pieces consisting of data material 
together. Contemporary MTI allow for massive, latent 
data collection and sophisticated computational mod-
eling (Tufekci, 2014). As Andrejevic and Gates write 
about the correlations of big data and surveillance: 
“Even if the underlying goal of capturing information 
for the pursuit of some form of advantage, leverage, or 
control remains constant, conventional understandings 
of the operation of surveillance and its social conse-
quences are being reconfigured by the ‘big data’ para-
digm” (Andrejevic & Gates, 2014, p. 185). Due to the 
need to interrogate vast quantities of data in very short 
times, surveillance tactics and strategies today neces-
sarily rely on automated data collection, data analysis, 
and database management to correlate personal be-
havior, carve out relevant patterns and to extract 
metadata. Accordingly, big data is not only reliant on al-
gorithms but also expands their regulatory power (see 
Beer, 2009; Bucher, 2012). While algorithms have been 
part of computing since the days of Turing, what we are 
currently witnessing is the marriage of (big) data and al-
gorithms. One consequence of this convergence is the 
intrusion of algorithms in everyday life, which aim to an-
alyze incredibly detailed physical, transactional, and be-
havioral data about people (Pasquale, 2015). Overall, big 
data play a critical role in turning many aspects of peo-
ple’s daily life into computerized data, thus enabling ac-
tors that have adequate resources to carry out surveil-
lance on an unprecedented scale. 
It is understood that all three elements—popular 
online platforms, locative media and big data—are far 
from disconnected from each other, but do inseparably 
interact with each other when it comes to surveillance. 
One can take popular online platforms as one example 
to explicate this entanglement. Given the enormous 
amount of interactions related to and oriented towards 
popular online platforms across the globe, these plat-
forms are for the most part big data-driven media envi-
ronments. At the same time, platforms today are in-
creasingly accessed via location-based applications and 
devices. One can therefore conclude that surveillance 
as such is a big data endeavor (see Andrejevic & Gates, 
2014; Tufekci, 2014). While the intimate relationship 
between technologies and surveillance goes at least 
back to evidence-producing tools like photography and 
telephone (Lauer, 2011), the pervasive embeddedness 
of media technologies and infrastructures in almost 
any spectrum of human life has introduced both a 
qualitative and quantitative difference. This observa-
tion echoes the principle that Shoshana Zuboff has 
convincingly outlined in her seminal writing on the Age 
of the Smart Machine: Everything that can be auto-
mated will be automated; everything that can be in-
formated will be informated; every digital application 
that can be used for surveillance and control will be used 
for surveillance and control (Zuboff, 1988). To avoid mis-
conceptions about this article’s argument, it is important 
to stress that technology neither emerges out of no-
where nor does it exist in a vacuum (Garfinkel, 2001). 
More to the point, technology by itself does not practice 
surveillance; it is the actor—individual, collective, organ-
izational, institutional—using particular technologies and 
the policies that set the legal frame that condition sur-
veillance. Accordingly, it is important to note that tech-
nology also incorporates the potential for empowering 
citizens, making government transparent, and broaden-
ing information access (Howard, 2015). Then again, tak-
ing into consideration recent developments, this is not 
exactly the way things appear to evolve. 
To start with, governmental surveillance and the 
objective to monitor citizens have a long history (Be-
niger, 1986). Not least since 9/11 and the declaration 
of the “war on terror”, the desire of governmental 
agencies to monitor every possible communication 
channel has further intensified. Based on the argument 
that national security is at risk (Monahan, 2006), gov-
ernments go as far as trying to make it legally binding 
for the tech-industry to install backdoors in their soft-
ware and hardware. For the same apparent reason, 
some democratic governments even aim to explicitly 
counter anonymizing and cryptography services. In ear-
ly 2015, Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron, for 
example, asked rhetorically: “[I]n our country, do we 
want to allow a means of communication between 
people…that we cannot read?”. Most people in sup-
port of liberal democracy and who believe in the right 
of free expression would answer this question in the 
affirmative. Cameron in contrast stated: “My answer to 
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that question is: No, we must not. The first duty of any 
government is to keep our country and our people 
safe” (see Temperton, 2015). Interestingly enough, in 
his crypto anarchist manifesto Tim May already indi-
cates that “the State will of course try to slow or halt 
the spread of this technology, citing national security 
concerns” (May, 1992). Here it is worth noting that 
“cryptographic techniques have been providing se-
crecy of message content for thousands of years” 
(Chaum, 1981, p. 84). Governmental discourses, as Da-
vid Barnard-Wills (2012) argues in his investigation of 
surveillance in the United Kingdom, tend to privilege 
surveillance as a response to social problems. Tellingly, 
“predictive policing”, for example, is turning crime 
problems into a data problem. Most prominently 
three-letter agencies across the globe have been busy 
developing new methods and tactics to gain access to 
as much valuable information as possible. It is under-
stood that in many cases these agencies collaborate 
across national boundaries. Interestingly, when it 
comes to surveillance, the often stark differences be-
tween democratic and authoritarian governments be-
come more or less negligible (Gomez, 2004). Consider-
ing the concrete practices resulting out of such 
strategies it can be said that institutionalized politics 
makes use of surveillance amongst others to monitor, 
censor, classify, constraining free speech and even to 
put people in danger worldwide (Schneier, 2015). One 
might even go as far as to state that the government’s 
control of informational infrastructures that make its 
territory and population legible has been a feature of 
the modern state since its birth (Beyer & McKelvey, 
2015). All the same, the state is no longer the only or 
most powerful actor in the field of surveillance. During 
the 1970s and 1980s, the general assumption was that 
privacy problems stemmed from the centralized con-
trol of personal information held by governments in 
discrete data banks (Bennett, 2008). Over the past two 
decades, an increasing amount of personal information 
has moved into corporate hands (see Whitaker, 1999). 
More recently, corporations involved in the manufac-
turing and establishing of MTI have forcefully entered 
the field of surveillance as they have realized the mon-
etary opportunities of data gathering, sorting, and pro-
cessing. In fact, with the rise of the data-capture indus-
try, surveillance is becoming more and more privatized 
and commercialized (see Ball & Snider, 2013). Cell 
phone providers track their customers’ location and 
know whom you with. In-store and online buying be-
haviors are constantly documented, and expose if cus-
tomers are sick, unemployed, or pregnant. E-mail 
communication and text messaging reveal sexual ori-
entation as well as intimate and casual friendships. 
Based on estimated income level, interests, and pur-
chase decisions, data broker corporations use surveil-
lance for personalized advertisements, news articles, 
search results and persuasion (Couldry & Turow, 2014). 
Scholars refer to these conditions as “surveillance capi-
talism” (Zuboff, 2015) to underline the substantial 
scope of contemporary dynamics. 
What is critical to note is that government agencies 
are important secondary beneficiaries of surveillance 
capitalism as they routinely access and exploit flows of 
data for their own purpose. In many cases govern-
ments directly offload the surveillance responsibility 
onto private-sector operators, as is the case in teleph-
ony and internet providers’ legal obligation to store da-
ta for a minimum period of time. Overall, the borders 
between surveillance tactics that rely on government 
practices and those that rely on corporate activities be-
come more and more obsolete, establishing a symbi-
otic public-private surveillance partnership. Not only 
are both camps drawing from the same interface and 
information, but their practices also augment each 
other. Again popular online platforms are one promi-
nent example for this tendency as they reveal how in-
dividual, institutional, market-based, security and intel-
ligence forms of surveillance co-exist with each other 
on the same site (Trottier, 2012). Surveillance is often 
illustrated as both a benefit for the development of 
Western capitalism and the modern nation-state (Mu-
rakami et al., 2006). As the Iranian-Canadian author 
and blogger Hossein Derakhshan stated after being re-
leased from a six years incarceration in Evin prison: 
“Being watched is something we all eventually have to 
get used to and live with and, sadly, it has nothing to 
do with the country of our residence. Ironically 
enough, states that cooperate with Facebook and Twit-
ter know much more about their citizens than those, 
like Iran, where the state has a tight grip on the Inter-
net but does not have legal access to social media 
companies” (Derakhshan, 2015). Corporate and gov-
ernmental actors alike—each for their very own rea-
sons—develop, maintain and exploit complex infra-
structures for collecting, storing, evaluating and putting 
to use huge amounts of data to ultimately construct an 
absolute information awareness. 
As the Snowden revelations have shown, surveil-
lance often takes place without consent or agreement. 
At the same time, fitting the notion of participatory 
surveillance, scholars have stressed that much of sur-
veillance is voluntary. To circumvent legal obstacles, 
like the Fourth Amendment in the United States and 
the European Union Data Protection Regulation, the 
data-capture industry relies on so-called voluntary dis-
closure of personal data; written into the terms and 
conditions that users constantly agree to without read-
ing the incomprehensible, small-type, multiple page-
long lists of rules. People actively participate in corpo-
rate surveillance because it promises convenience and 
rewards (Andrejevic, 2007). Millions of people wish to 
have their purchases tracked—and even complain 
when credit or supermarket affinity card transactions 
are missed—to accumulate frequent-flyer miles, loyalty 
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discounts and other forms of “reward”. People to a 
large degree accept the routine collection of their data 
for the convenience of paying for a meal by credit card, 
or paying for a toll with an electronic tag mounted on 
their car (Garfinkel, 2001). As Simson Garfinkel puts is: 
“It’s a simple bargain, albeit a Faustian one” (2001, p. 
5). Similarly, people willingly submit to government 
surveillance because it promises protection (Schneier, 
2015). One informative case of continual voluntary 
self-surveillance is the quantified-self movement. While 
the earnest and geeky initiation of the “movement” by a 
group of technology evangelists was seeking better living 
through personalized control of data, commercial pro-
viders have increasingly entered the scene. The empha-
sis has therefore moved away from control over data 
towards the minutely quantified, intensively monitored, 
feedback-driven trajectories of self-improvement of 
health, diet, and fitness, as well as work habits, sex life, 
sleep patterns, and so on (Cohen, 2015/forthcoming). In 
2014, Kolibree introduced a toothbrush that measures 
brushing patterns that transmit data to your 
smartphone to enable self-control as well as allow par-
ents to monitor their children’s brushing. Also in 2014, 
for example, Generali—a German holding company con-
sisting of about 20 insurance companies—introduced a 
new rate that allows customers to use an application to 
track their behavior, which transmits data to the insur-
ance company. In return, customers who have a “health-
ier” lifestyle according to the company’s algorithmic 
evaluation receive special concessions. 
Bringing the above-said together, it is reasonable to 
diagnose a strong tendency towards increased surveil-
lance as well as the intersection of different forms and 
modes of surveillance. Surveillance—and its attendant 
apparatus, devices and systems—has become a central 
dispositif of our time (Bauman & Lyon, 2013; Gane et 
al., 2007). Today information flows and data monitor-
ing on a mass scale produce a “surveillant assemblage” 
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000, pp. 614-615) that predomi-
nately serves the interests of powerful entities, both 
private and public. Accordingly, contemporary tenden-
cies complicate common conceptualizations of surveil-
lance as discipline and control. Linking contemporary 
surveillance apparatuses with totalitarian political sys-
tems has become an oversimplified equation to make. 
“[T]he surveillance society is better thought of as the 
outcome of modern organizational practices, business-
es, government and the military than as a covert con-
spiracy” (Murakami et al., 2006, p. 1). Considering the 
way things have developed over the past decades, it is 
reasonable to assume that the coming years will see 
governments and corporations expanding their already 
effective assemblages of surveillance. Yet, as will be ar-
gued in the third section of this article, this does not ex-
clude the fact that other actors like civil society organiza-
tions counter-act current tendencies. Before I will 
explicate this aspect, I will outline why all this actually 
matters when we think of the existing correlations be-
tween MTI and the health of democratic constellations. 
3. Privacy and Why It Matters for Democracy at Large 
The surveillance strategies and practices discussed pre-
viously put into question our deeply rooted sense of 
privacy. According to critical voices, privacy and datafi-
cation simply appear to be incompatible (Lane et al., 
2014). Again, it is vital to stress that “privacy-invasive 
technology does not exist in a vacuum” (Garfinkel, 
2001, p. 6). Taking into account the shifting field of ac-
tors involved in surveillance, Lane and her colleagues 
emphasize that data on human beings today are “less 
often held by organizations with traditional knowledge 
about how to protect privacy” (Lane et al., 2014, p. xi). 
The lack of privacy can become life threatening, for ex-
ample in the case of journalists working in non- or 
pseudo-democratic countries. More generally, the lack 
of privacy puts into question the health of democracy 
per se. Aggressive and wide-ranging forms of surveil-
lance preemptively decimate the possibility of a “right 
to be let alone”, as Gabriella Coleman (2014) has ar-
gued by referring back to Louis Warren and Samuel 
Brandeis’ (1890) classical conception. Warren and 
Brandeis, who were among the first to consider the ba-
sis of privacy law, defined protection of the private 
realm as the foundation of (individual) freedom. “Pri-
vacy” is by all means a deeply contested phenomenon, 
as the discourse and concerns about privacy have var-
ied over time and definitions strongly depend on varying 
interests and agendas. All the same, researchers agree 
that current and emerging technological developments 
in data processing pose serious challenges to societies as 
they destabilize the delicate balance between privacy, 
security, autonomy and democratic rights. 
In this context, a helpful conception of privacy is 
the approach that privacy is the “claim of individuals, 
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how and to what extent information about them 
is communicated to others” (Westin, 1967, p. 7). Priva-
cy, in other words, is something that every human be-
ing is in need of to some degree. To avoid misconcep-
tion, it is important to note that privacy here is not 
understood as a reinforcement of liberal individualism, 
but as a phenomenon critical for societal arrangements 
as a whole. In other words, the question for the rele-
vance of privacy is framed in social terms and concep-
tualized as an explicitly political issue. In this context, 
Julie Cohen’s (2012) article on what privacy is for con-
tributes a rich set of arguments to the discussion. As 
she puts it: “Privacy shelters dynamic, emergent sub-
jectivity from the efforts of commercial and govern-
ment actors to render individuals and communities 
fixed, transparent, and predictable. It protects the situ-
ated practices of boundary management through 
which the capacity for self-determination develops” 
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(Cohen, 2012, p. 1905). Accordingly, for Cohen, “free-
dom from surveillance, whether public or private, is 
foundational to the practice of informed and reflective 
citizenship. Privacy therefore is an indispensable struc-
tural feature of liberal democratic political systems” 
(Cohen, 2012, p. 1905). Conditions of diminished priva-
cy seriously weaken practices of citizenship as 
“privacy isn’t just about hiding things. It’s about self-
possession, autonomy, and integrity” (Garfinkel, 2001, 
p. 4). Seen from this perspective, privacy incursions not 
only harm individuals’ capacity for democratic self-
government, but also jeopardize the continuing vitality 
of political and intellectual culture at large (Cohen, 
2012, p. 1906). Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the 
World Wide Web, recently stated that the extension of 
surveillance powers translate into a “destruction of 
human rights” (Katz, 2012). Ultimately, as Cohen re-
marks, “A society that permits the unchecked ascend-
ancy of surveillance infrastructures cannot hope to re-
main a liberal democracy” (Cohen, 2012, p. 1912). In 
more practical terms, privacy plays important functions 
within democratic constellations by promoting, 
amongst other things, the freedom of association, 
shielding scholarship and science from unnecessary in-
terference by government, permitting and protecting 
secret ballots, and by serving as a shield for those ac-
tors that operate to keep government accountable 
(Westin, 1967). All in all, the politics around privacy are 
critical for the constitution of democracy. 
Let me now bring this conception of privacy into di-
alogue with the earlier-discussed elements concerning 
the pervasiveness of contemporary MTI that co-
determines both people’s practice of and the capacity 
for citizenship. A large portion of participatory MTI to-
day aim to turn people into predictable citizen-
consumers whose preferred modes of self determina-
tion play out along revenue-generating trajectories 
(Dean, 2009). Along with the spread of MTI, public and 
private regimes of surveillance have become an ordi-
nary and mundane process that in many cases narrows 
critical citizenship and opportunity for it to flourish. 
“Imbuing our networked information technologies with 
a different politics will require both the vision to appre-
ciate privacy’s dynamism and the will to think creatively 
about preserving it” (Cohen, 2012, p. 1933). By implica-
tion, the widespread—if not even omnipresent—
construction of systematic surveillance apparatuses fun-
damentally changes conceptions of what it means to be 
“visible” or “in public” (Haggerty & Ericson, 2006). This is 
particularly highlighted by scholars that explore the 
ways that exposure within surveillance assemblages af-
fects both identity and resistance (Ball, 2009). Privacy 
prevents the absolute politicizing of life and protects the 
ability of actors to develop their identity as well as to 
voice their concerns freely across media environments. 
In summary, the literature on surveillance leaves us 
with the convincing argument that the quantity and 
quality of monitoring have changed drastically over the 
past decades. One not only witnesses increasing sur-
veillance and decreasing privacy, but also that current 
and emerging surveillance assemblages have funda-
mentally altered people’s experience of and interac-
tions with MTI. It is further reasonable to assume that 
the lack of privacy is harmful materially, psychological-
ly, socially, and politically. After taking into account the 
arguments of the above-mentioned scholars, it be-
comes clear that discussing surveillance is also an ex-
amination about the health of democratic constella-
tions. On a more theoretical level, one can distill that 
as surveillance merges into a corporate/government 
joint venture and shifts towards a participatory phe-
nomenon, established conceptualizations of surveil-
lance as discipline and control appear obsolete. So far, 
the array of actors that researchers and journalists alike 
have focused on are the state and the corporate sector 
as well as their consolidation (Ball & Snider, 2013; Be-
niger, 1986). Similarly, the worrying correlations be-
tween participatory media and surveillance have also 
gained considerable scholarly interest (Albrechtslund, 
2008; Fuchs et al., 2012). Likewise, writings discussing 
the societal relevance of whistleblowing and activists’ 
data leaks—both aspects that are connected to priva-
cy—have emerged recently (Brevini et al., 2013). What 
has been much less noticed and investigated, however, 
is the role played by actors who counter surveillance. 
This is all the more astonishing, considering the fact 
that due to all-encompassing surveillance, the question 
asking who is acting “against” surveillance is ever more 
pressing. In his seminal warning about the steady slide 
toward the surveillance society, Lyon (2001, pp. 131-
135) has argued that sustaining privacy depends less 
on mechanisms devised and implemented by elites, 
and more on the extent to which resistance to surveil-
lance practices are enacted through movements and 
organizations in civil society (see Bennett, 2008). To 
discuss exactly this issue is the aim of the following sec-
tion. Throughout the third part of this article, I will 
therefore present findings from qualitative research 
that has been conducted on the Chaos Computer Club 
(CCC)—Europe’s largest and one of the world’s oldest 
hacker organizations—from 2011–2014. The data pre-
sented in this article is based on 40 face-to-face inter-
views, numerous participant observations at public 
gatherings, hackerspaces, hacker conventions and pri-
vate get-togethers as well as on a media analysis that 
took into account self-mediation, practices, media cov-
erage and different forms and styles of media access. I 
aim to make a convincing argument that the CCC coun-
ter-acts contemporary surveillance assemblages in two 
ways: first, by de-constructing existing technology and 
by supporting, building, maintaining and using alterna-
tive media technologies and infrastructures that enable 
more secure and anonymous communication; and sec-
ond, by articulating their expertise related to contem-
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porary MTI to a wide range of audiences, publics and 
actors. The hacker organization here stands represent-
atively for a growing network of activists that feel am-
bivalent and uncomfortable towards the affordances of 
MTI to be used as a surveillance apparatus. 
4. Counter-Acting Surveillance Assemblages  
Since the year of its foundation in 1981, the CCC con-
siders itself a non-governmental, non-partisan, and 
voluntary based organization that is involved in fram-
ing media technologies and infrastructures as political 
phenomena relevant to society at large. The hacker or-
ganization explicitly conceptualizes MTI as being em-
bedded in complex power dynamics and act according-
ly (Kubitschko, 2015a). After a brief identification 
stage, the collective registered as a nonprofit organiza-
tion in 1984 and started to promote their political en-
deavor of advancing more secure communication and 
information infrastructures more explicitly. In addition, 
as a registered lobby group, the Club advocates for 
more transparency in government, communication as a 
human right, and free access to communication and in-
formation infrastructures for everyone. Colin Bennett 
(2008) has referred to these kinds of actors as privacy 
advocates that resist the spread of surveillance and in 
fact explicitly lists the Chaos Computer Club as a priva-
cy advocacy organization. Ever since the late 1990s, the 
Club has seen an exponential rise of membership that 
today figures around 5500 members. To explicate the 
argument that the hacker organization is acting on in-
dispensable structural features of contemporary demo-
cratic constellations, this article will focus on the Club’s 
engagement since the early 2000s. Focusing on a specific 
time frame also allows us to concentrate on an episode 
when the three above-mentioned elements—popular 
online platforms, locative media and big data—were 
coming to life ever more prominently. 
To start with, the CCC, of course, does what one 
might primarily expect from a hacker organization: hack-
ing. Yet, it is worth emphasizing that hacking can take 
many different forms. In the context of the research pre-
sented here, hacking is understood as critical, creative, 
reflective and subversive use of technology that allows 
creating new meanings. This kind of engagement goes 
back to the early days of the CCC and has intensified 
over the past decade. One of the recent example is the 
CCC’s so-called Federal Trojan hack in 2011. By disclosing 
governmental surveillance software that was used (un-
constitutionally) by German police forces, the Club ini-
tiated a heated political debate about the entangle-
ments of technological developments and state 
surveillance in Germany. This was two years before the 
issue of surveillance gained global currency owing to 
Snowden’s revelations about the US National Security 
Agency (see Möller & Mollen, 2014). Here it is helpful to 
note that the notion of “data protection”, which is de-
rived from the German Datenschutz, entered the vo-
cabulary of European experts in the 1960s and 1970s at 
about the same time as the notion of informational or 
data privacy arose. Germany, in other words, can gener-
ally be considered a surveillance aware nation. The no-
tion of Informationsselbstbestimmung (informational 
self-determination), for example, has constitutional sta-
tus in Germany. This example shows that hacktivism, as 
hackers’ political engagement is generally entitled (see 
Jordan & Taylor, 2004), does indeed include digital direct 
action (Coleman, 2014). Hacking in the case of the Fed-
eral Trojan means acting as a watchdog of governmental 
agencies by uncovering surveillance tactics and practic-
es. By deconstructing the abstractness of a given tech-
nology—surveillance software in this case—the CCC ma-
terializes its formerly unrecognized political quality. 
Another principal set of hacker practices to coun-
ter-act surveillance assemblages is the CCC’s financial, 
social and technical support of infrastructural projects 
that establish alternative information and communica-
tion environments. That is to say, the CCC aims to con-
tribute to create (more or less) uncontrolled spaces 
where the regulation of the state and the interests of 
corporations cannot intrude. Developing anonymous 
communication spaces for citizens has been a project 
deeply embedded in hacker cultures for some time. 
The reasons and ideologies of so-called crypto-
warriors, for example, differ, but they align in the de-
sire and development of tools that might ensure to en-
hance privacy (see Greenberg, 2012). In practice, this 
means that besides critically engaging with technologi-
cal artifacts the CCC puts a lot of effort into building, 
supporting and maintaining alternative infrastructures 
that enable more secure and anonymous ways of 
communicating outside the realm of data-hungry, prof-
it-oriented assemblages. During the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics, for example, the Club provided a manual and 
matching tools enabling journalists and other interest-
ed users to circumvent online censorship and surveil-
lance by allowing people free access to information 
and communication. At the time of research, the hack-
er organization was operating five Tor servers and was 
running one of the most used XMPP servers in the 
world. The Onion Router (Tor) is an overlay network 
that has its roots David Chaum’s (1981) notion of mix 
networks and is best considered a privacy enhancing 
technology. More concretely, it is a client software that 
enhances online anonymity by directing internet traffic 
through a volunteer network of special-purpose serv-
ers scattered around the globe. The Extensible Messag-
ing and Presence Protocol (XMPP), formerly known as 
Jabber, is an open technology that includes applica-
tions like instant messaging, multi-party chat, voice and 
video calls. “The right to privacy includes the right to 
anonymity. The only way to protect this right is to ex-
ercise it” (Garfinkel, 2001, p. 172). The two systems are 
designed to protect people’s anonymity while browsing 
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the internet and to conceal information from unwant-
ed listeners. The design of Tor and XMPP makes it diffi-
cult—and potentially even impossible—for govern-
ments to seize the content or to eavesdrop on the 
interactions. It is important to mention that Tor and 
XMPP might be considered alternative MTIs, but this 
does not necessarily imply that they are autonomous in 
an absolute sense, as they still depend on the commer-
cial internet backbone like cables and internet ex-
change points. At the same time, these are initiatives 
that constitute serious alternatives to existing profit-
driven online services highlighting that cryptography 
can be a powerful tool for controlling the unwanted 
spread of personalized information. The Club’s aim is 
to set limits on surveillance assemblages by making 
anonymous access as the standard mode of operation 
across the network’s architecture. 
Tor is amongst others widely used by journalists 
and human rights activists who feel the need to con-
ceal their identity due to the drastic penalties that their 
publications might imply in their home country. Simi-
larly, most aspects of whistleblowing today would be 
unimaginable without anonymizing services. Encryp-
tion is an effective way of avoiding feeding surveillance 
assemblages with data. Some cryptography enthusiasts 
go as far as arguing that the technology is a silver bullet 
for achieving universal privacy, solving virtually all of 
the problems posed by contemporary surveillance as-
semblages. Tim May explains in his manifesto, which 
he read at the first cypherpunk founding meeting in 
1992 in Silicon Valley, and later posted to the group’s 
electronic mailing list: “Computer technology is on the 
verge of providing the ability for individuals and groups 
to communicate and interact with each other in a total-
ly anonymous manner” (May, 1992). According to May, 
“crypto anarchy” would, among other things, “alter 
completely the nature of government regulation,…the 
ability to keep information secret, and will even alter 
the nature of trust and reputation” (May, 1992). Yet, it 
is important to note that cryptography does not neces-
sarily protect privacy, but also protects information 
(Garfinkel, 2001). What cryptography does in the first 
place is to guarantee the confidentiality of a given 
transmission, which is why it is widely used in online 
banking and other confidential transactions today. 
Nonetheless, when it comes to people’s day-to-day 
communication and interactions across media envi-
ronments, encryption is far from being a mass phe-
nomenon. It requires the use of specific services and 
precautions on the side of the users to avoid acci-
dentally disclosing their true identity. So, this article is 
not trying to argue that cryptography is the single best 
or only tool to counter surveillance. All the same, creat-
ing, supporting and maintaining alternative infrastruc-
tures that enable more secure and private communica-
tion means to establish conditions under which ideas 
can be expressed, exchanged and circulated in new 
ways. The examples of Tor and XMPP also underline 
the notion that hacking is best conceptualized as criti-
cal, creative, reflective and subversive use of technolo-
gy that allows creating new meanings. In other words, 
the hacker organization’s practices related to technol-
ogy demonstrate a constructive way of countering sur-
veillance. By doing this, the CCC is part of a global net-
work of activists that enable a large variety of people 
to act with and through more secure MTI. 
To expand on this line of thought, it is also interest-
ing to note that CCC’s engagement in relation to en-
cryption and anonymizing services is double-sided. On 
the one hand, members use alternative technologies 
and infrastructures for inward-oriented communica-
tion. Since many activities—like the above-mentioned 
Federal Trojan hack—need to be coordinated and take 
place “in secrecy”, the Club cannot rely on commercial 
platforms or other readily accessible services. From this 
perspective, privacy is fundamental for the Club to 
practice their political activities. On the other hand, the 
CCC brings its idea of free and secure communication 
to life through developing, supporting and maintaining 
the mentioned alternatives for the larger public. Tor 
and XMPP enable people to exercise anonymity and to 
handle data flows about themselves. Surveillance 
might indeed be “structurally asymmetrical” (An-
drejevic & Gates, 2014, p. 192) as it is generally availa-
ble only to actors with access to and control over data 
collection, data analysis, and database management. 
All the same, as the case of the CCC underlines, there 
are efforts to consciously and purposefully advance the 
cause of privacy protection. Accordingly, by acting on 
digital self-determination and the right to information-
al privacy the hacker organization is co-determining the 
balance of privacy, security, autonomy and democratic 
rights. The Club acts on creating what Warren and 
Brandeis (1890) called a “right of privacy” and—in 
many ways echoing the belief of the two Boston law-
yers—refuses to believe that privacy has to die for 
technology to flourish. As a side effect, so to say, the 
case study presented in this article shows the human 
face of technology as it explicitly demonstrates that 
not machines but individual and collective human ac-
tors establish and maintain particular technologies. 
While the over-whelming majority of contemporary 
media environments is set up to gather, collect and 
manage big data, the CCC supports, builds, maintains 
and uses alternative media technologies and infrastruc-
tures that are set up to respect privacy and to honor 
autonomy. The initiatives that Club members originate 
and encourage are “interstitial spaces within infor-
mation processing practices” (Cohen, 2012, p. 1931) 
that provide “breathing room for personal boundary 
management” (Cohen, 2012, p. 1932) outside the 
realm of routine surveillance. Acting on surveillance as-
semblages therefore is based on critical, creative, re-
flective and subversive engagements with technology 
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that allow creating new meanings. 
Taken together what has been outlined so far, the 
Club’s modes of engagement with MTI can be consid-
ered largely technical; which is to say that they require 
a high level of expertise (skills, knowledge and experi-
ence) related to technology per se (Kubitschko, 2015b). 
The hackers’ contestation of surveillance assemblages, 
however, goes beyond “activism gone electronic” (Jor-
dan & Taylor, 2004, p. 1), since CCC members also ar-
ticulate their expertise related to contemporary MTI to 
a wide range of audiences, publics and actors. They do 
so by means of public gatherings, self-mediation, cov-
erage by mainstream media outlets as well as by inter-
acting with institutional politics. Ever since the early 
1980s the CCC has organized public gatherings like the 
annual Chaos Communication Congress, which today 
attracts more than 6000 visitors. Self-mediation prac-
tices include running individual websites and personal 
blogs, creating radio shows and podcasts, as well as 
posting their views on popular online platform ac-
counts. At the same time, mainstream media not only 
increasingly cover the Club’s activities but also grant 
individual members—in particular the organization’s 
spokespersons—access to their outlets. Articulating 
their expertise across media environments not only 
gives the CCC a voice that is heard by a large number of 
people, it also enables the hackers to raise awareness 
and spread knowledge related to surveillance and oth-
er related issues where politics and technology collide. 
This facet of articulation is particularly important be-
cause being able to act on a given issue first of all pre-
conditions that one is aware of the existence and rele-
vance of the issue at hand. Spreading awareness and 
knowledge, in other words, is a precondition to enable 
other people’s engagement. In addition to interacting 
with different audiences and publics, the hackers also 
carry their standpoint to the realm of traditional cen-
ters of power through advising senior politicians, legis-
lators and the constitutional court in Germany. At the 
same time, articulation also includes legal measures. In 
2014, together with the International League of Human 
Rights, the CCC filed criminal complaints against the 
German Government for its violation of the right to 
privacy and obstruction of justice by bearing and coop-
erating with the electronic surveillance of German citi-
zens by foreign secret services. As matters stand, the 
court proceeding is still taking place. No matter what 
the actual outcome will be, the complaint raised the 
public’s attention towards governmental surveillance 
practices. In fact, making their voice heard in the do-
main of institutionalized politics and gaining recogni-
tion of mainstream media outlets are two dynamics 
that perpetuate each other in interesting ways. 
In the case of the CCC, acting on the notion of pri-
vacy does not only refer to doing “stuff” with technol-
ogy but also the ability to actively deal with both the 
functions and effects of technology. Put in more con-
crete terms, the Club is counter-acting surveillance as-
semblages through direct digital action—de-constructing 
existing technology and supporting, building, maintain-
ing and using alternative media technologies and infra-
structures—as well as publicly thematizing and prob-
lematizing the issue. By merging technically oriented 
operations and discursive activities, the hacker organi-
zation brings forward a twofold strategy: On the one 
hand, the hackers open up the possibility for people to 
use privacy enhancing technology, and on the other 
hand, the CCC spreads awareness and knowledge re-
lated to surveillance and privacy. Instead of exclusively 
relying on cryptography and the science of secret 
communication, the Club practices a form of activism 
that acknowledges the relevance of counter-acting sur-
veillance assemblages on different layers. Accordingly, 
in addition to co-creating interstitial spaces for personal 
boundary management within information and commu-
nication landscapes (Cohen, 2012), the hacker organiza-
tion also takes part in shaping discursive spaces that es-
tablish exchanges of knowledge, flows of information 
and new levels of awareness. Taken together, this 
demonstrates that the CCC’s interventions in the do-
mains of technology can therefore be conceptualized as 
interventions in social and political domains. 
5. Conclusions 
Following the quasi-omnipresent spread of media 
technologies and infrastructures, surveillance has 
turned into a mundane practice enacted by a wide 
range of entities. The approach taken in this article is 
not to discuss surveillance per se, but instead to exam-
ine how one of the world’s largest (and Europe’s old-
est) hacker organizations is countering contemporary 
surveillance assemblages. To do so, I have first illumi-
nated the correlations between online platforms, loca-
tive media and big data—three elements that have 
lastingly influenced the way people experience surveil-
lance and the way surveillance is practiced. Subse-
quently, the article has explicated the growing inter-
section of governmental and private-sector efforts 
related to surveillance. Taking these expanding assem-
blages of surveillance (see Haggerty & Ericson, 2000) as 
a starting point of discussion, the line of argumentation 
followed Cohen’s concept that “freedom from surveil-
lance, whether public or private, is foundational to the 
practice of informed and reflective citizenship” (Cohen, 
2012, p. 1905). By presenting qualitative research on 
the Chaos Computer Club, the article illustrates the 
ways in which the hacker organization is acting on “an 
indispensable structural feature of liberal democratic 
political systems” (Cohen, 2012, p. 1905). More con-
cretely, it has made clear that counter-acting surveil-
lance assemblages and establishing new regimes of 
privacy is taking place through bringing together direct 
digital action and different forms of articulation. That is 
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to say, the Club deconstructs existing technology as 
well as supports, builds, maintains and uses alternative 
media technologies and infrastructures. At the same 
time, CCC members also spread knowledge and create 
awareness towards issues related to surveillance and 
privacy by articulating their “technical” expertise to a 
wide range of audiences, publics and actors. According-
ly, it is argued that hacker organizations like the CCC 
provide an exemplary case study for highlighting the 
efforts of civil society organizations to counter-act con-
temporary surveillance assemblages that infiltrate 
people’s everyday-life. Following the reasoning that 
privacy is critical for democratic citizenship to flourish, 
the Club’s engagement can be considered a contribu-
tion to the formation of indispensable structural fea-
tures of contemporary democratic constellations. 
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